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While reductive materialist theories of mind are suscep­
tible to devastating objections, it seems one cannot outright 
deny some sort of genuine cormection between /I the mind" 
and the brain. It is a fact that neurophysiology has enjoyed 
significant empirical success; testimony to this fact can be 
seen, for instance, in the pharmaceutical industry, where 
drugs which affect the chemistry of the brain can be used to 
alleviate numerous mental disorders. Nevertheless, in this 
essay I will argue that the materialist thesis is problematic, 
particularly at the linguistic level. I will thenpropose a model 
which salvages some of the significant empirical insights 
provided by neurophysiology, yet avoids the linguistic con­
fusion of materialism proper by drastically curtailing the 
neurophysiologist's role in understanding and explaining 
"the mind". 
Materialism and Reduction 
"Whenever a new science achieves its first big successes, its 
enthusias.tic acolytes always fancy that all questions are now 
soluble by extension of its methods of solving its questions" 
(Ryle 76). On this model, the neurophysiologists claim that 
questions about the mental states and events of humans and 
other obviously conscious animals can be reduced to ques­
tions about states and events of the brain and nervous sys­
tem. This scientific stance finds its philosophical counterpart 
in a cluster of views known broadly as "reductive material­
ism" (which I shall simply call "materialism"). Accordingto 
materialists, what we call lithe mental" is either identical 
with, or entirely determined by, the physical. Typically, 
1/ physical" is meant to refer to the brain and nervous system, 
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although many materialists believe that the mental can also 
be realized by certain non-biological physical systems (for 
instance, AI theorists hold that a sufficiently complex system 
of silicon chips implementing a sufficiently complex com­
puter program can be said to have Umental" properties and 
capabilities). In any case, the materialists "wish to deny the 
existence of any irred ucible mental phenomena in the world" 
(Searle 27). Thus, both the neurophysiologists and the mate­
rialists propose an explanatory reduction: the mental can be 
explained solely in terms of the neurophysiological because 
the mental is nothing over and above the neurophysiolo gical; 
every "mental" state or event is reducible to some neuro­
physiological correlate. 
I characterize these views as "reductive" whether or not 
they deny the existence of mental phenomena such as, most 
significantly, consciousness. The existence of mental phe­
nomena can be denied by such theories (Churchlandian 
eliminative materialism being the most explicit and extreme 
example), but it need not be. Materialists can hold that there 
are such things as consciousness, imagination, beliefs, 
desires, sensations, etc. However, the materialist position is 
reductive in that for every mental particular, there is some 
neurophysiological particular that is identical with, causes, 
or otherwise wholly determines the nature of its correspond­
ing mental particular. To give a complete neurophysiologi­
cal story of a human being is to give a complete "mental" 
story of that human being. The neurophysiologist's" aim is 
to explain what thinking, perceiving, etc. are by reference to 
the 'thinking' or I interpreting', 'inferring' or 'hypothesizing', 
allegedly engaged in by the brain and its parts (Hacker 
149)...." Hence, there is an explanatory reduction (of the 
mental to the neurophysiological). 
Linguistic Objections 
In Philosophical Investigatiol1s L Wittgenstein makes the 
follOWing point: "[O]nly of a living human being and what 
resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it 
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has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or 
unconscious (Wittgenstein 97)." This list could be extended 
to include all of the vocabulary which refers to the mental, 
including thinking, believing, desiring, remembering, the 
various moods and emotions, etc.; all these words refer to 
mental states and events. According to Wittgenstein, these 
words are predicable only of human beings because we use 
these words to refer to what human beings do, viz., perceive, 
think, believe, etc1: "[T]he criteria for the application of such 
[words] consist in behaviour patterns in specific contexts 
against a background of widely ramifying complex capaci­
ties manifest in behaviour (Hacker 147)./1 We attribute the 
various mental (viz., psychological) properties to persons (to 
adopt Straws on's terminology) because only a person could 
manifest the contextually situated behaviour which consti­
tutes the criteria for attributing said properties. 
The materialist claims that the psychological properties 
of a person are entirely dependent upon, and thus can be 
explained solely in reference to, that person's neurophysi­
ological properties; the neurophysiological explanation is 
said to be "basic". But this entails that the various psycho­
logical predicates must be ascribed to physiological mecha­
nisms, since they and nothing else are invoked in the expla­
nation of the psychological property. The materialist is thus 
bound to speak of brains thinking, imagining! being in pain! 
seeing (in conjunction with the eyes), etc. At this point! the 
materialist's explanation has become nonsensical. It makes 
no sense to thinkofa brainexhibiting thecriteria by whichwe 
apply psychological predicates. A brain cannot cry out in 
pain! express a belief, argue for an hypothesis, watch a 
sunset, or read a book. This is not due to the obvious fact that 
abrainhasneithera vocalnora visual apparatus; to the extent 
that the brain is cited as the causal origin of all these activities, 
it can be said to be what is acting, and hence is the bearer of 
the psychological predicates. Yet it is these criteria alone 
which enable us to say of a personthat she feels pain, believes, 
thinks, sees, or understands written language. Since only 
persons themselves can exhibit the criteria for ascribing 
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psychological predicates, they must be presupposed in any 
story of the psychological. The neurophysiological explana­
tion, which talks on one hand about brains and on the other 
about psychological attributes which these brains presum­
ably manifest in various biochemical states and events, is not 
merely incomplete; it is incoherent. 
I have used scarce quotes when speaking about "the 
mind" because there is a tendency to suppose that in denying 
that one can attribute psychological predicates to neuro­
physiological mechanisms, one is thereby committed to at­
tributing them to "the mind". hnmediately one is con­
fronted with the ontologically dubious entity made famous 
by Descartes; indeed, it is the very absurdity of the notion of 
a thinking, immaterial substance somehow inhering in and 
animating a body which provides much of the impetus for 
the more scientifically acceptable materialist explanation. 
Denying materialism does not mean one must speak in terms 
of "minds" in any more than a metaphorical sense; one can 
simply talk about human beings or persons, entities which 
cannot present any serious ontological uncertainty. Once 
persons have been posited, one can simply proceed to at­
tribute them psychological predicates of perceiving, believ­
ing, etc., based simply on the fact that these are things that 
persons (not their brains or "minds") do. 
Brains Matter 
Nevertheless, the materialist will insist that it is undeni­
able that persons require brains. This, of course, is true. 
Remove the brain from a person's head, and you no longer 
have a living person; you are left with a corpse. But the 
linguistic objection outlined above denies none of this; it is a 
grammatical objection not an empirical one. Inhis exegesis of 
Wittgenstein's Investigations, Hacker explains what this 
means: 
[W]e know what [psychological] verbs mean only in 
so far as we have mastered their existing use, which 
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does not license applying them to the body or its 
parts, save derivatively .... [A] lthough neurological 
complexity (crudely speaking) is empirically requi­
site for possession of perceptuat volitional, and cog­
nitive faculties, the kinds of features ... thatunderlie, 
and constitute criteria for such faculties and their 
exercise to a [person] are quite different from this. 
(Hacker 148,162) 
These criteria are what persons, not brains, do and say. But 
just as it does not follow from accepting this that one must 
1/ deny that there is a mental process" ,it also does not follow 
that one must posit 1/ an unbridgeable gulf between con­
sciousness and brain-process" (Wittgenstein 1022,124). 
The neuroscientist proposes an explanation which com­
bines the terms, and hence the rules of use, from the U person­
story" and the "brain-story". This combination "produces a 
conflict of rules and hence incoherence in the neuroscientists' 
use of these terms" (Hacker 148-9). Hacker emphasizes that 
the neuroscientist erroneously uses these terms, not that 
there is anything wrong with these terms per se. Accordingly 
he admits that the use of neurophysiological terminology in 
explanations of psychological predicates could be a coherent 
possibility, though not on the present model of such explanc'l­
tions: 
If neurophysiologists ... or philosophers wish to 
change existing grammar, to introduce new ways of 
speaking, they may do SOi but their new stipulations 
must be explained and conditions of application laid 
down. (Hacker 148) 
I have no intention of introducing any "new ways of speak­
ing", but I would like now to introduce and develop a 
grammatical distinction which, I shall argue, picks up on the 
ontological connection between the psychological and the 
neurophysiological, a connection which all non-Cartesians 
(Wittgenstein and Hacker included) seem willing to admit 
exists at some level. The details of this grammatical distinc­
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tion constitute the stipulations by which this ontological 
connection can be explained. Although this might presently 
sound like an attempt to vindicate the materialist position, I 
am quite sure that those philosophers and scientists who 
enthusiastically endorse neurophysiological explanation will 
be less than satisfied with my conclusions. 
Transitive and Intransitive Consciousness 
Consciousness, according to Searle, lIis the central men­
tal notion" (Searle 84). Furthermore, he argues that the 
subjective, qualitative character of consciousness cannot, 
even in principle, be accounted for by a purely objective 
neurophysiological explanation. Searle is certainly correct in 
emphasizing the importance of consciousness; any account 
which cannot explain consciousness is grossly incomplete. I 
shall assume for now that materialists do notwish to deny the 
existence of consciousness, but believe (if falsely) that an 
ideal neurophysiological explanation will be able to account 
for consciousness.3 
There are two relevant senses of the word /I conscious­
ness". Norman Malcolm provides a general picture of this 
distinction: 
There is a grammatical difference between two uses 
of the word'conscious'. Inone use this word requires 
an object: one is said to be conscious ofsomething, or 
to be conscious that so-and-so.... There is another use 
of the word I conscious' in which it does not take an 
object. If we think that a person who was knocked 
unconscious has regained consciousness, we can say, 
'He is conscious', without needing to add an 'of' or a 
'that'. (Armstrong & Malcolm 3) 
Consciousness with an object is called" transitive conscious­
ness", while the more generic sense of consciousness, in 
which one either is or is not conscious or II a wake", regardless 
of what one is conscious of or that, is called "intransitive 
consciousness" . 4 
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Although the general idea should be obvious, there is 
clearlymore to be said about this distinction. It is particularly 
helpful to note that there are numerous sorts of transitive 
consciousness. I can be transitively conscious of, for instance, 
stones, cats, the weather, and countless other things in the 
physical world, via the senses; I can see a stone or smell a cat, 
and by doing so I am conscious of the stone or the cat (or 
perhaps the cat' s smell; the distinction is irrelevan t here). I 
can be conscious ofmyself or bits of myself; when I am in pain 
because I have burnt my finger, I am conscious ofmy finger 
in a particularly unpleasant (viz., painful) way. 
Further types of transitive consciousness can be under~ 
stood by using different prepositions. In these cases, the 
object of the preposition will be identical with the object of 
consciousness. Thus, when thirsty (which perhaps involves, 
among other things, consciousness ofone's dry mouth), one 
can have a desire for aglass of water. One can be attentive to 
what a pontificating orator is saying; and one might be angry 
at, or perhaps even in love with, the orator. In all these cases, 
one is in one way or another conscious of something or 
someone, i.e., transitively conscious. 
Malcolm suggests that whatever we can be conscious of, 
we can also be conscious that; for instance, I can be conscious 
afsomeone playing the piano, and also conscious that some~ 
one is playing the piano. These may seem like the same thing, 
but there is "a difference between a concept.free mental state 
(e.g., an experience) and a concept-charged mental state (e.g., 
a belief)" (Dretske 263). In the above example, then, con­
sciousness of someone playing the piano is, say, seeing a 
person sitting at the piano and hearing certain sounds ema­
nating from the instrument. Consciousness that someone is 
a playing the piano, on the other hand, is a belief which 
necessarily involves certain concepts, viz., concepts of pi­
anos, music, and persons. An animal which lacks these 
concepts cannot be conceptually conscious that a piano is 
being played, but it can be conscious of the piano being 
played (I.e., it can hear it). 
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Dretske characterizes this distinction as one between 
consciousness of facts and consciousness of things, but I 
think that the more general and relevant distinction is be­
tween conceptual and non-conceptual consciousness, and 
that the word that best captures the nature of the more 
conceptual forms of consciousness. Thus one can be said to 
believe (veridically or not) that Santa Claus exists; 
remember that onehas to take the garbage out, or understand 
that /I chat" means"cat" inFrench. Whatever the status of the 
distinction between consciousness ofand consciousness that, 
it is clear that both are types of transitive consciousness, 
viz., consciousness with an object. 
Intransitive consciousness seems to be a far less complex 
notion thantransitive consciousness; it is consciousness" tou t 
court" ,not consciousness ofor that anything (Armstrong & 
Malcolm 3). Intransitive consciousness is consciousness 
without an object. I think it is best thought of as a necessary 
"background" for transitive consciousness.s That is, one 
mustbeintransitively conscious, inthe sense of being "awake", 
in order to be transitively conscious. Intransitive conscious­
ness can be better understood by examining a misconstrual of 
what it is. Armstrong says, "Suppose it is true to say of 
somebody that he is seeing a horse. Normally at least, this is 
an intransitive idiom" (Armstrong 117). Not at alL One sees 
a horse; here we clearly have a type of consciousness 
(seeing) which has an object (a horse), and hence is a form of 
transitive consciousness. I am uncertain why Armstrong 
would say this, given that he later claims (correctly) that 
11 there is no intransitive perception"; presumably "He saw a 
horse" as an idiom suggests a type of intransitive conscious­
ness, but how it does so is entirely unclear (Armstrong 117). 
Transitive consciousness presupposes intransitive con­
sciousness, in the sense that to be able to say of a person that 
she perceives her surroundings, has sensations, expresses 
beliefs, etc., presupposes her "being awake".6 Intransitive 
consciousness is not, however, a mere static state; there are 
degrees of intransitive consciousness, as Searle illustrates: 
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If during sleep I have dreams, I become conscious, 
though dream forms of consciousness in general are 
of a much lower level of intensity and vividness than 
ordinary waking consciousness. Consciousness can 
vary in degree even during our waking hours, as for 
example when we move from being wide awake and 
alert to sleepy or drowsy, or simply bored and inat­
tentive. Some people introduce chemical substances 
into their brains for the purpose of producing altered 
states of consciousness, but even without chemical 
assistance, it is possible in ordinary life to distinguish 
different degrees and forms of consciousness. (Searle 
83) 
The types of consciousness Searle is describing in the above 
passage can all be understood as intransitive;7 they do not 
take objects. One cannot be awake of or that anything, no 
matter how alert, attentive, drowsy, or distracted one may be 
in that particular state of "awakeness". By affecting the brain 
with alcohol, one cannot be said to be drunk of or that an 
object, fact, etc. Nevertheless, intransitive consciousness (of 
whatever sort) is a necessary condition of transitive con­
sciousness; it is the requisite "background" for the more 
seeing, hearing, feeling emotions, thinking, and all the other 
interesting things that persons do. 
Consciousness and Materialism 
The empirical findings so lauded by materialism seems to 
provide an asymmetrical understanding of these two types 
of consciousness, with intransitive consciousness enjoying 
the more thorough explanation. According to the materialist, 
the fact that everything can be explained physically means 
that everything can be explained causally, viz., in terms of 
causal physicallaws. Our sense ofintransitiveconsciousness 
as a background state fits the causal model quite well. To be 
/I awake" in the most basic sense, one requires a properly 
functioning, oxygenated brain in a comparatively normal 
biochemical state. Modifications of this biochemical state 
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produce different types of intransitive consciousness. For 
instance, a brain which is being affected by the chemicals 
found in tranquilizers will produce a II lower level" of intran­
sitive consciousness (i.e., will cause a person to be drowsy); 
on the other hand, a brain being flooded by endorphins 
causes an intransitive state of consciousness characterized by 
an overall sense of elation (though one is not, in this sense, 
elated of or that anything). Different general IImoods" as 
different types of intransitive consciousnesst such as being 
ecstatic or depressed (though, to distinguish moods from 
emotions (which are types of transitive consciousness), not 
ecstatic or depressed ofor that anything), seem quite ame­
nable to causal explanation: 
Moods are pervasive, they are rather simple, espe­
cially because they have no essential intentionality, 
and it looks like there ought even to be a biochemical 
account of some moods. We already have drugs that 
are used to alleviate clinical depression. (Searle 140-1) 
A neurophysiological (Le., physical) explanation of the vari­
ous types of intransitive consciousness seems to be a genuine 
possibility, because intransitive consciousness seems to be a 
largely (I will not say entirely) causal notion; one is caused to 
be alert, drunk, or depressed because one's brain is well­
rested, permeated by alcohol, or in some state of chemical 
imbalance. Indeed, neurophysiologists have been able to 
explain a great deal in this domain. 
Transitive consciousness, on the other hand, has not been 
nearly as well explained by neurophysiology. 8 Explanations 
of remembering, believing, and other such cognitive types of 
consciousness seem particularly impoverished; inparticular, 
explanations of how the content of particular memories and 
thoughts is 1/stored" in particular parts of the brain is highly 
theoretical at best. Explanations of perception fare a bit 
better, but still seem insufficient to account for such things 
such as the Gestalt structure of perception in purely neuro­
physiological terms. Neuroscientists readily acknowledge 
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the high level of theoriticity in many of their explanations, 
and, for some types of consciousness, the lack of any reason­
ably complete or concrete explanation. However, they tend 
to dismiss these problems by invoking a future when, as a 
result of continued successful empirical research, all such 
difficulties will allegedly disappear. 
Transitive consciousness is characterized byits having an 
object. It is consciousness of or that something, which is to say 
that it is consciousness directed towards an object. Hence, 
transitive consciousness involves an intentional relation to its 
object.9 These intentional relations cannot be reduced to 
causal relations, simply because they are two fundamentally 
different sorts of relations; the essence of intentionality is its 
Iidirectedness" or /I aboutness", while this element is not 
present in causality. Therefore, transitive consciousness is 
not explainable on the neurophysiologist's model of an en­
tirely causal, physical system. Any appeal to future empirical 
discoveries about the brain is futile, because these will only 
be discoveries of causal events and relations in the brain; 
intentionality, however, is not reducible to causality. 
Consciousness and Language 
EYen if empirical discoveries allowed the neuroscientist 
to establish some definite level of psycho-physical parallel­
ism in cases of transitive consciousness}O it does not follow 
that one can give a reductive explanation of psychological 
predicates. The linguistic points made above still hold: 
Persons are the bearers of psychological predicates, and it is 
what persons do that constitutes the criteria for ascribing 
these predicates; hence, an explanation of the psychological 
must be based in language about persons and what they do, 
no matter how much is known about brains and what they 
do. It is clearly the case that persons bear the psychological 
predicates which correspond to the various types of transi­
tive consciousness. Persons see, feel and understand; brains 
do not. Furthermore, it is the actions of persons that serve as 
criteria for attributing the various types of transitive con­
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sdousness. We say that someone believes that such-and -such 
is the case because tha t person verbally affirms the belief, acts 
in accordance with it; etc.; to explain that someone believes 
something because his brain carries some sort of chemical 
code presupposes that we have used the regular criteria of 
what he says and does to determine that he does, in fact, 
believe such-and-such. 
Intransi tive consciousness might seem to be exempt from 
this point if, as I have suggested, it can largely be understood 
in terms of a causal, neurophysiological explanation. How­
ever, it is still persons, not their brains, who are said to be 
awake, asleep, elated, depressed, inebriated, etc.; persons are 
the bearers ofthe psychological predicates which correspond 
to. the various types of intransitive consciousness. Even 
thoughintransitive consciousness can largely be explained in 
neurophysiological/biochemical terms, such an explanation 
is secondary to an explanation in terms of the persons to 
whom the predicates of intransitive consciousness are as­
cribed. Empirical knowledge of a certain aspect of persons, 
viz., the influence of their brains on their intransitively 
conscious states, cannot absolve an explanation of this aspect 
from presupposing persons. As brains are no more than 
parts of persons, so too is neurophysiological explanation no 
more than a part of the explanation of persons. 
Conclusion 
The fact that persons are more than their neurophysi­
ological makeup does not imply that neurophysiology is 
irrelevant to an explanation of persons and what they do and 
say. As we have seen, neurophysiology is particularly rel­
evant in understanding and explaining intransitive con­
sciousness, while it has a far lesser role in explaining transi­
tive consciousness. However, a purely neurophysiological 
explanation is not sufficient to explain any sort of conscious­
ness, precisely because it leaves out of the explanations those 
very things which are conscious, persons.u Hacker warns 
that crossing the language of persons with the language of 
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neurophysiology "produces a conflict of rules and hence 
incoherence", but only if one attempts to reduce the "person 
story" to the "brain story" (Hacker 148-9). If the "brainstory" 
is viewed as no more than a supplement to the prior, basic 
Ifperson story" f and if stipulations of applicability are care­
fully laid out, then the crossing of languages need not result 
in incoherence; rather, it might lead to a more inclusive and 
unitary account of persons - for whatever else they are, 
persons are beings which possess brains, and these brains are 
necessary for their personhood. What I have attempted to do 
here is provide a basic outline for how such a project might 
proceed. 
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1. Animals can, of course, perceive things and have 
sensations, but it is dubious whether or not they can engage 
in more complex cognitive activities. 
2. This is (admittedly) a quick rejoinder to anyone who 
would assume that a Wittgensteinian approach dispenses 
with the subjective aspect of personhood in favour of a 
behaviorist or verificationist stance. 
3. Eliminative materialists willfully deny its existence; I 
can only dismiss this as absurd a philosophical position as 
one could ever take. 
4. Malcolm and others go on to use this distinction in 
debates about the nature of introspection and self-conscious­
ness. While it is true that these issues follow from the distinc­
tion, my project here is to show how these concepts of 
consciousness relate specifically to the materialist thesis. 
S. This is notthe same as Searle's notion of IIBackground" 
(Searle 175ff.). 
6. The literature seems equally divided on whether 
intransitive consciousness presupposes transitive conscious­
ness; I am inclined to say that it does not, although it is almost 
always the case that manifestations of transitive conscious­
ness constitute the criteria by which we attribute intransitive 
consciousness. 
7. Dreaming constitutes an exception; we dream of 
things, hence it is clearly a type of transitive consciousness. 
Nevertheless, I believe dreaming can be accommodated on 
this model; as a sketch, I suggest that one could posit a very 
low level of intransitive consciousness (" awakenesslt ) which 
would facilitate the transitive consciousness of dreaming 
(which itself seems to be a peculiar species of imagination). 
8. I do not claim to be abreast of state-of-the-art neuro­
physiology, butthis is the sense I get of the discipline's status. 
9. I do not wish to identify transitive consciousness and 
intentionality; there seem to be many cases of intentionality 
without transitive consciousness. For example, a belief is 
intentional evenif one is not presently conscious of that belief. 
10. The discovery that certain areas of the brain are 
"modules" for certain types of transitive consciousness (es­
pecially percpetion) is an example of a small step towards 
such a arallelism. 
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11. To say nothing of the Nagelian objection that a 
reductive materialist account could not possibly account for 
the subjective, qualitative nature of consciousness; such sub­
jectivity seems to be an essential aspect of consciousness 
(transitive or intransitive). 
